A Simple Proof of Sybil-Proof

Happy to share this piece on a theoretical advance in sybil-proofing permissionless blockchains -- not exactly an Ethereum-specific paper, but the approach solves a fundamental network funding problem that is hurting Ethereum (i.e. "how to incentivize lite-clients" and "how to pay for Infura from the existing fee") and is would be useful to have the dev community aware of the advance.

https://github.com/SaitoTech/papers/blob/main/sybil/A_Simple_Proof_of_Sybil_Proof_Lancashire-Parris_2023.pdf

Of some interest to those who have an economics background and dig into the paper, the approach works by creating an inverted collective action problem. All nodes are collectively better off hoarding transactions as it minimizes competition for the fees, but in a hoarding equilibrium each individual node can increase its income relative to its hoarding peers by sharing with its children. This creates a dynamic where self-interest pushes hoarding nodes to share as a defensive strategy. Information propagation becomes the dominant strategy as it is most profitable regardless of what other participants do.

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